amended its rules in an attempt to stimulate more activity and provide some coordination. There is sentiment in the Senate for similar action as indicated by the Interim Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate (U.S. Congress, 1976) and by Senate support for &dquo;Sunset&dquo; legislation in 1978.
When it comes to performance Bibby's (1968) comment that oversight is &dquo;Congress' neglected function&dquo; is still the standard introductory observation in papers on the subject. The (Harris, 1964 (Ogul, 1976) . The Ogul definition is useful in that it directs attention to the fact that oversight is a latent as well as a manifest function of Congress and that many of the things done by Members and Senators contribute to oversight. It is so broad, however, that it is hard to exclude very many congressional activities from inclusion under the oversight rubric. I define oversight as congressional review of the actions of the federal departments, agencies, and commissions and of the programs and policies they administer. This includes review that takes place during program and policy implementation as well as afterwards, but excludes much of what Congress now does when it considers proposals for new programs or even for the expansion of current programs.
As noted above, it is often asserted that Congress neglects oversight. What does occur, with a few exceptions, is said to be neither continuing, comprehensive, nor systematic (Bibby, 1968) . Agencies or programs are rarely overseen persistently, the focus of the oversight effort is often very narrow, and it is certainly the case that systematic oversight efforts (those involving a methodical approach governed by some rational principle which orders and gives unity to the elements of the effort) are just about impossible to uncover.
A basic assumption underlying much of the normative discussion in this article is that, simply stated, oversight of administration is desirable because it provides one mechanism by which those who administer the public policies which singly or cumulatively affect us in fundamental ways can be held accountable and their programs evaluated. I also assume that more oversight is usually better than less.1 The idea behind this is quite simple: even oversight performed sporadically, focused on fairly narrow subjects, and utilizing an unsystematic approach should at least hold down flagrant abuses of power by administrators, make them more responsive to the wishes of Congress, and (Scher, 1963 Scher, 1963; Ogul, 1976) (Singer, 1978) , 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1975 Figure 1 . The horizontal axis is the total number of permanent, inquiries and investigation staff available in 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1975 Scher (1963) , Ogul (1976) and Bibby (1968 Bibby ( , 1974 
